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2John P. Judd and Brian Motley*
In 1982 andearly 1983 the velocityofMIdeclinedsharply, leading the
Federal Reserve to place "less than the usual emphasis" on MI and to
give more attention to M2 as an indicator ofmonetary policy. It was
argued that deposit rate deregulation made the demandfor MI unstable
and so caused it to become a less reliable indicator. In this paper, we
examinethestability ofthederrtand both for MI andfor M2 during this
period, with a view to testing whether demand instability was an impor-
tant cause ofthe velocity decline. We conclude that the velocity decline
was related more to the unexpectedfall in inflation and nominal interest
rates than to moneydemandinstability. In particular, M1appearstohave
beena surprisinglyrobustindicatorin theface ofderegulation. Although
M2 was somewhat affected, deregulation was not the primary soutce of
its velocity decline.
Over most of the period in which the Federal
Reserve has established explicit target ranges for
the monetary aggregates, MI has been regarded as
the primary aggregate or at least has been given
equal weight with M2 in formulating monetary
policy. The Federal Reserve considered Ml to be
the most reliable monetary aggregate on both
empirical and theoretical grounds. Taken as a whole,
empirical studies provide more. evidence ofa close
relationship betweenmonetaryaggregatesandmac-
roeconotnic variables suchas real GNPandprices,
in the caseofnarrow (transactions-type) aggregates
than in the case ofbroader (asset-type) aggregates.
These studies are consistent with the theoretical
expectation that the public's demand to hold trans-
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actions balances is more stable than the demand to
hold balances for savings purposes. However, the
status ofMl changed in mid-1982, when the FOMe
began placing "less than the usual weight" on MI
andgivingmoreattentionto the broaderaggregates,
especially M2.
One problem apparently leading to the change
was the sharp decline in the velocity of Ml__the
ratio of nominal GNP to Ml~in 1982 and early
1983. The growth rate ofMI velocity fell far below
its 3 percenttrend ofthe previous20 years. Uncer-
tainty as to whether this change in the relationship
between Ml and GNP would continue made it diffi-
cult to set targets for MI. A potential explanation
lay in the deregulationofdeposit rates, which might
alter the public's demand to hold M I. The introduc-
tion of interest-bearing NOW accounts could cause
an inflow ofsavings-type funds into M1and thereby
change its basic nature as a measure oftransactions
balances. The resulting impact on the MI-demandrelationship might make the relationship between
MI and GNP less reliable, both currently and in the
future, and this would make it more difficult for the
Federal Reserve to formulate MI targets that were
consistent with its macroeconomic objectives.
Although these potential problems with MI were
widely debated, less attention seems to have been
paid to the possibility that M2 also couldbe affected
by similarfactors. Problems with M2 appearto be at
leastequally likely, since thebroaderaggregate has
undergone even more deregulation in recentyears.
Therefore, the de-emphasis ofMI in favor ofM2 as
a guide to monetary policymaking cannot be fully
evaluated without a comparative analysis ofthe two
aggregates. In this paper, we attempt such a
comparison.
We test the stability of the public's demand both
for MI and for the non-MI component of M2 in
recent years, and especially in the 1982-83 periodof
velocity declines. Ourfindings are that deregulation
had no substantial effect on M I~demand in the
1981-83 period when interest-bearing NOW
accounts became a substantial portion ofthat aggre-
gate. The unexpected fall in the velocity· of MI
appears to have been related more to an unexpected
decline in inflation and nominal interest rates than
to the effects ofderegulation or any other source of
money demand instability. (See the article in this
volume by Michael Keran for another analysis of
velocity.)
With respect to the non-MI component of M2,
the decline in the velocity of that aggregate also
seems to have been mainly related to the inflation
and interest rate decline, and not to instability in the
public's demand. However, ourtests do find changes
in the responsiveness of non-transactions M2 to
interest rates at twopoints in time: (I) in mid-1978
when Money Market Certificates, with interest rate
ceilings tied to market rates of interest, were intro-
duced; and (2) in 1983, when Money MarketDeposit
Accounts, with unregulated yields, were introduced.
This second change poses a problem for the use of
M2 in monetary policy at the present time because
only arelatively smallamountofdata is available to
estimate the new relationship.
Thus, ourmain conclusion is that the demand for
MI appears to have been surprisingly robust in the
face ofderegulation, whereas M2 demand appears
to have been more substantially affected. This, of
course, does not rule out the possibility of future
problems with MI, but it does provide a reason to
doubt thatMI's value as an indicatorrelative to M2
will diminish in thefuture asderegulationcontinues.
This paper is organized as follows: Section I
discusses the great velocity decline of 1982-83, and
the policy debate surrounding it. Sections II and III
present empirical evidence on the stability of the
demand for Ml and M2, respectively. Section IV
presents conclusions.
1981 and the first quarterof 1983, compared with its
3 percent trend rateofincrease overthe previous 22
years. Although this decline in MI velocity was
given the most attention, there was also a large
decrease in the velocity ofM2. Over the same five
quarters, it fell at a 7.6 percent rate compared toits
previous one-half of one percent trend rate of
growth. Moreover, the decline in M2 velocity did
not simply reflect the decline in its MI component;
the velocity ofthe non-MlcomponentofM2fel1 at
an 8.3 percent rate overthese five quarters. Com-
pared to the previous variability ofthese velocities,
each ofthese declines was statistically significant. I
The velocities ofthese three variables are shown in
Chart 1.
I. The "Great Velocity Decline"
The.velocity ofmoney-the ratio ofGNP to the
outstanding volume of a given monetary aggre-
gate-is a crucial concept in monetary targeting. If
one could accurately forecast the growth in velocity,
one could be assured of estimating growth rate
targets for the monetary aggregates thatare consis-
tent with any desired growth rate ofnominal GNP.
In practice, predicting velocity is not an easy matter
as it depends on several key underlying behavioral
relationships in the economy.
Problems in forecasting· velocity wereexper-
ienced in 1982 and early in 1983 when, in a distinct
break from its long·run upward trend, the velocity
of MI fell sharply. MI velocity declined at a 5.7
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of Velocity of M2-M1
The De-emphasis of M1
Beginning with its October 1982 meeting, the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) began
placing "less than the usual weight" on MI, and
paying more attention to the broader monetary
decrease as a result ofa change in the determinants
of GNP. If, for example, there is a change in the
public's aggregatedemandfor goods andservicesat
given interest rates, nominal GNP, and hence velo-
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The unexpected behaviorofMI and M2 velocity
in 1982 suggested that one or more ofthe relation-
ships underlying velocity had changed. One.Such
relationship is the public's demand to hold money.
According to traditional economic theory,. this
demanddepends positively onGNP, and negatively
on the opportunity cost of holding money-
measured by the spread between the market rate of
interest on short-term securities and the interest rate
paidonmoney itself. Ifthe money demandfunction
"shifts"-the public chooses to hold more or less
money at given interest rates and GNP levels-the
ratio of GNP to the stock of money (velocity) will
change. Velocity may also behave unexpectedly if
the responsiveness ofmoney demand to thevari.~bles
(income and interest rates) thatdetermine it change.
For example, if demand becomes more responsive
to interest rates, a given decline in rates willleadto
a larger increase in money demand and hence a
greater fall in velocity than would be expected on
the basis of past experience. In addition, velocity
can change unexpectedly ifone ofthe determinants
of money demand, such as the market interest rate
or the rate paid on money, changes unexpectedly.
This last proposition means that the money demand
function can be perfectly stable even while velocity
exhibits surprising behavior.
Although velocity andmoney demandareclosely
related, not all variations in velocity maybe related
to money demand. Since velocity is the ratio of
nominal GNP to money, it also may increase or
58aggregates, especially M2. At the time, the major
reasons cited werepossible distortions to MIcaused
by the reinvestment of funds from maturing All
Savers Certificates and uncertainty about the pub-
lic's response to the introduction of MMDAs. As
time passed,someanalysts arguedthatthe introduc-
tionofNOW accountsona nationwide basis in 1981
(and the. introduction of Super-NOW accountsin
1983) had caused MI to include a larger share of
,'savings-type" balances. Bothofthese new instru-
ments permit explicit interest onchecking accounts
-regular NOWs permit a higher fixed rate to be
paid, while Super-NOWs permit the payment of
variable market rates. However, the latter accounts
still constitute only a small partofMl.
Portfolio shifts induced by the introduction of
NOWs could have altered the basic transactions
character ofMI. Specifically, the public's demand
to hold these savings-type balances in M 1 might
have become more sensitive both to changes in
market interest rates and to variations in investor
sentimentthan the transactionbalancestraditionally
held in the narrow aggregate. As a result, past
empirical relationships between MI and macro-
economic variables such as income and interest
rates might be a poor guide to current and future
relationships.
These potential sources ofinstability in the pub-
lic's demand for MI appeared to be materializing
with the great velocity decline of 1982-83, which
suggested that the demand to hold MI was shifting
upward. Many argued that this shift was occurring
because the public was responding to the uncertainty
of the recession by· accumulating precautionary
balances in NOW accounts.
3 This change in investor
sentiment supposedly demonstrated that the demand
for MIhad become unstable. In priorbusinesscycle
downturns, this precautionary build-up would have
shown up mainly in the non-MI component ofM2,
but now that MI alsohad savings balances in it, the
narrow aggregate also was subjecttosuch swings in
investorsentiment.
A second, and related, potential problem with
MI also was raised during this period. In August
1982, market interest rates fell sharply and con-
tributed to a sharp boost in growth in the monetary
aggregates. Some argued that for MI this boost was
significantly larger than that predicted by past his-
torical relationships, and they inferred that the
59
responsiveness ofMI demand to changes in market
interest rates had increased compared to earlier
years.
4 Two reasons for such an increase in interest
elasticity were proffered. First, with MI now con-
taining more savings balances, it was possible that it
wouldbe more sensitive to marketyields than it was
in the past, when it was closerto apuretransactions
aggregate. Second, since NOWaccounts pay expli-
cit interest but demand deposits do not, a· given
change in market interest rates causes a largerpro-
portionalchange in the opportunitycost(the market
rate minus the rate on money) of holding NOWs
thanofdemand deposits. As aconsequence, changes
in marketrates mightcause largerchanges in NOWs
than in demand deposits, thereby increasing the
responsiveness of MI as a whole to interest rate
changes as NOWs become a larger fraction ofMIS.
The introduction ofNOW accounts was believed
by some analysts to have caused demand for MI to
become unreliable not only because its velocity
declined dramatically, but also because the velocity
ofMIA (MI minus interest-bearing NOWs) stayed
closer to normal cyclical growth rates.6 The velo-
city of MIA remained essentially unchanged be-
tween the fourth quarter of1981 and the first quarter
of1983 in contrast to the 5.7 percent decline in the
velocity ofMl. Simply stated, this argument invol-
ved four points: (I) the velocity of MI behaved
"abnormally" while the velocity of MIA behaved
"normally"; (2) ifthe velocity decline was not the
resultofinstability inMI demand, one wouldexpect
MIA velocity also to have behaved abnormally; (3)
the difference between MI and MIA is NOWs; (4)
thus, the unusual behaviorofMI-velocitymust have
had something to do with NOW accounts. In Sec-
tion II, we test the hypothesis that the public's
demand for MIA was stable in 1982-83, as well as
the hypothesis that the demand forMl was unstable
in that period.
M2Also Could Have Problems
Despite the extensive analysis and discussion of
potential problems with MI during this period, far
less concern was focused on M2. It appears that
there was Illore confidence in M2 than MI because
the former aggregate is broader. Presumably, M2
would internalize many ofthe problems associated
with portfolio shifting that could distort Ml. For
example, while increased precautionary demands
would cause MI demand to shift up, they would beless likely to distort M2 because many ofthe port-
folio substitutions might come from instruments in
M2.
This view has some merit. However, it neglects a
number ofother potential problems that can distort
M2. First, although no one would dispute that M2
has a far largersavings component than MI, it is not
nearly broad enough to internalize all the portfolio
substitutions that are likely to occur. For example,
large CDs and Treasury bills are not in M2, yet they
areclosesubstitutes with some ofthe instruments in
that aggl1 anges in yield spreads and investor
sentime cause shifts between these instru-
ments,.. yy torting M2.
Second,< 2 has been deregulated to an even
greater extent than MI. This deregulation began in
mid-I978, when depository institutions were per-
mitted to issue six-month money market certificates
with ceiling rates tied to other short·term market
yields. Before that date, most of the instruments
included in M2 yielded a fixed rate of return. For
example, more than sixty percent of M2 consisted
ofpassbook savings accounts (with fixed ceilings)
plus MI in early 1978. Today, almost all of the
non-MI component ofM2 yields market-determined
rates ofreturn.7 This situation contrasts with MI,
since regular NOW accounts, the main interest-
bearing component, still have fixed ceilings.
This institutional change in M2 since 1978 is
important because the demand to hold M2 is affected
by the spread between the rate of return on the
instruments in that aggregate andthemarket rate on
competing instruments. When the own-rate on M2
was held constant by government regulation,
changes in the market rate produced equal changes
in this spread. The gradual deregulation ofdeposit
rates after 1978 made the own rate on non-trans-
actionsM2
8 increasingly responsive to changes in
interest rates on other market instruments. As a
result, the spread between the own and the market
rate-that is, the opportunity cost ofholdingM2-
became increasingly unresponsive.
This effect ofderegulation is illustrated in Table
I, which compares the response ofthe own-rate on
non-transactions M2 to changes in the commercial
paperrate before and afterJuly 1978.
9 In the earlier
period, a 100 basis point rise in the commercial
paperrate led to only a5 point rise in the own-rate in
the same month and to a 41 point rise after 12
months. By contrast, the equation estimated over
the 1978-1983 period implies thatthe 100 basis point
rise produces a 39 point rise within a month and
Table 1
The Own Rate on Non-Transactions M2(M2-M1)*
1970:11-1978:06 1978:07-1983:12
Cumulative Response ofOwn








































*Derived from an equation regressing the own rate onnon-transactions M2 (see footnote 9) on adistributed lag ofthe
six-month commercial paper rate.
**Statistically different from zero at the 99 percent level.
***Statistically different from zero at the 99 percent level. but insignificantly different from unity.
60roughly a 100 point rise after nine months. Thus, a
given change in the market rate now has a signifi-
cantly smaller impact on the interest rate spread in
the short-run and is associated with no significant
change in the spread in the long-run. This is a major
departu.re from thesituation before .1978.
The demand to hold non-transactions M2 depends
bothon the own-rate on that aggregate and on market
rates on competing instruments. However, the find-
ing that the own-rate itself responds primarily to
changes in market rates implies that the demandcan
be expressed as depending only on market rates.
Moreover, because the response ofthe own-rate to
market rates has become larger and quicker since
1978, we expect the long-run elasticity ofdemand
with respect to market rates to have declined since
1978, and the lag between changes in the market
rate and in the growth rate ofnon-transactionsM2 to
have shortened. Such a change in the demand func-
tion for the non-transactions component of M2
would impair the usefulness of M2 as an inter-
mediate target ofmonetary policy, at least during a
transition period before these new relationships
could be pinned down.
II. The Stability of M1 Demand
As noted above, the 1982 decline in the velocity
ofMI was attributed by some analysts to two closely
related developments: (I) an upward shift in MI
demand as the public's precautionary demands for
liquid savings balances increased in the recession,
and (2) an increase in the size ofthe response ofMI
demand to changes in market interestratesrelatedto
the increased proportion ofsavings-type balances in
M\. Both of these developments, if they actually
occurred, would suggest that the transactions char-
acter of MI had been altered by deregulation, and
that MI-demand is likely to be less stable in the
future.
The staff of the Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco (FRBSF) has advanced an alternative
view. It presented evidence from its MI-demand
equation that the decline in velocity did not represent
instability in the demand for money function, but
rather was the result ofthe sharp decline in nominal
interest rates associated with the slowing ofinflation
after late-198\. 10 The decline in nominal interest
rates caused the quantityofmoney demanded to rise
according to normal and predictable response pat-
terns, while the decrease in inflation prevented this
nominal interest rate decline from being translated
into a reduction in real interest rates and so preven-
ted an acceleration in nominal GNP. As a conse-
quence, velocityfell.
Acorollaryofthis explanation is that the surprise
in 1982 was not a shift in money demand but rather
an unusually sharp drop in inflation. At the begin-
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ning of that year, the reduction in inflation raised
real interest rates and contributed to weakness in
real income. With the income elasticity of MI
demand less than unity at least in the short-run, this
slowergrowth in income was reflected in the decline
in velocity in the early part of1982. After mid-year,
weakness in the economy induced the Federal
Reserve to ease monetary policy. The associated
drop in nominal interest rates was the major factor
in the velocity declines in the latter part of 1982 and
into 1983.
According to the above explanation, the decline
in velocity would prove to be only temporary. MI
would rise relative to GNP only as long as the
public's demand for money was stimulated by
declines in interest rates. Once rates stabilized a{
new lower levels, their effects on money growth
and hence on velocity would dissipate according to
the lagged response of the demand for money to
interest rates. The empirical results of the FRBSF
staffsuggested that these interest rate changes would
have only minoreffects on MIgrowth after the first
quarterof1983. This result implied that MI velocity
would behave more normally beginning with the
secondquarterof1983, and that it would be risky to
allow a continuation of the rapid Mlgrowth after
that date. Thisprediction has been broadly con-
firmed by subsequent developments: MI velocity
increased at an average rate of4.2 percent between
1983/Q2 and 1984/Q2.Empirical Evidence
The evidence ofa stable money demandfunction
mentioned earlier consisted of a set of dynamic
simulations of anMI-demand equation over 1982
and 1983, and a series ofthree-month-aheadex ante
forecasts of MI made at the beginning of each
quarterofthat period usingthe SanFranciscoMOl1ey
Market Model. Both exercises tracked MI quite
well and showed no evidence ofa shiftinMI-
demand large enoughto have significantlydistorted
policy. The MI demand equation in the Mbney
Market Model uses as explanatory variables real
personal income, the six-month commercial paper
rate, the personal consumption expenditures deflator
and changes in total bank loans. The model is esti-
mated with a sample period beginning in 1976.
Ithas been argued that the ability ofthemodel t9
predict well in 1982-83 depends upon the post-I975
estimation period. The argument is that when longer
sample periods are used, the estimatedirtterest
elasticity ofmoney demand is smaller (in absolute
value), and thus that equations based on longer
samples tend to under-forecast MI (and over-fore-
cast velocity) in 1982-83.
11 However, simulation
results obtained from a conventional MI-demand
equation (excluding bank loans) estimated over
longer sample periods (beginning in 1959 and also
beginning in 1970) yielded reasonably accurate
results in 1982-83. Moreover, the estimated interest
elasticities over these periods were close to those
estimated overthe shorter sample period.
The simulation results are shown in Table 2. In
this table, the columns marked "Dynamic Simula-
tions-A, B, C and D" show simulated values of
MI under two alternative specifications of MI
demand estimated over two sample periods.
Columns A and B both were computed from MI
equations estimated over 1959/04-1981/12. The
equation used for Column A constrains the interest
elasticity of MI demand to be a constant over the
sample period (that is, the logarithm of Ml is
regressed on the logarithm ofthe commercial paper
Table 2
Growth in M1 (Annual Rates)*
Actual Dynamic Simulations·· Forecasts···
A B C D
1982/QI 5.4 7.9 8.0 8.8 9.0 6.4
Q2 3.9 6,9 6.8 7.5 7.7 6.1
Q3 9.8 8.2 9.7 9.1 11.0 7.1
Q4 14.4 10.6 12.8 11.8 14.8 17.4
1983/QI 13.0 11.0 10.9 10.7 11.9 12.5
Q2 11.5 9.9 9.7 10.1 9.8 9.5
Q3 6.2 8.8 7.6 8.0 6.9 9.4
Q4 4.9 7.9 7.1 7.9 7.8 7.4
Average: 8.6 8.9 9.1 9.2 9.9 9.5
F(24, 265) 1.88+ 1.83+ +
F(24, 137) 1.50 1.57
*CaJculated as last month in a quarterover last monthinprevious quarter.
**Estimated equations are shown in the Appendix.
Equation A: 1959/04-1981/12estimation period, constant interest elasticity.
Equation B: 1959/04-1981/12estirnationperiod, variable interest elasticity.
Equation C: 1970101-1981112 estirnationperiod'5()n~taI'lt interest elasticity.
Equation D: 1970101-1981/12 estimation periOd, variable interest elasticity.
***Three-month-ahead forecasts made in the middle ofthefirst month ofthe forecast period using the San Francisco Money Market
mOdel. SeeJohn P. Judd, "AMonthly MOdel oftheMoney and BankLoanMarkets", EconomicReview, Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco, Supplement, Fall 1984 (forthcoming).
+Significant at the one-percent level.
+ + Significant at the five-percent level.
62rate, LCPRT), whereas the equation for column B
permits the interesteIasticitytorise andfall with the
level ofthe interestrate (thatis, theloganthmofMl
is regressed on the commercial paper rate in per-
centage points, CPRT). ColumnsC and D are de-
rived frotnequations estimated over 1970/01-
1981/12, where C asstlInes a coristantelasticityand
D uses a variable elasticity. (The four estifuated
equations used·in these columns are presented in
Table A-I oftheAppendix.) The column in Table 2
headed "Forecasts" presents ex ante forecasts of
MImade at the beginning ofeach quarter usirig the
full San Francisco Money Market Model.
Several key conclusions emerge from these
results. First, all of the simulations (as well as the
forecasts) capture the timing ofthe acceleration in
MI growth in 1982/Q3-1983/Ql, with slower
growth before and aft~rthose.quarters. That pattern
of growth corresponds to the predictabk response
of MI-demandto interest rate changes over the
period. Itappears unlikely that this pattern had
much to do with recession-induced precautionary
demands, since rapid MI growth continued into
1983, well after the recession came to an end.
Second, the results uniformly reject the hypo-
thesis that MIdemand shifted up, as the deregulation
viewsuggests. Indeed, all four equations overpre-
dieted MI growth, whereas the hypothesis of an
upward shift would imply that the equations would
yield under-predictions. Chow-tests for structural
change in 1982-83 versus the earlier part of the
sample do show a statistically significant shift for
the sample beginning in 1959, but not for that begin-
ning in 1970. However, ifsuch a shiftdid occur, it
was in a downward direction, not in the upward
direction predicted by the precautionary demand
hypothesis. Somewhatparadoxic;llly, the t",gequa-
tions showing signs ofa downward shift produced
more accurate dynamic simulations than those not
indicating a shift. Equations C andD,with the
shortefsamplepenod, over-prediCt~cIbya.na.verage
of 0.6 and 1.3 percentage points. of annualized
growth, while the two longer-sample equations
over-predicted by only 0.3 and 0.5 percentage
pOints. Thus, in retrospect, the data do not seem to
bear out fears that the 1982-83 velocity declines
were symptomatic ofshifting MI-demand relation-
ships under deregulation.
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We now tum to the argument thatM1demand has
become more sensitive to interest rates, and that
these greaterelasticities were animportant element
in producing the velocity decline. To test this
proposition, we estimated the same four equations
used in Table 2 Over the following four pairs of
sample periods:
I 1959.04 1980.12
Ia 1970.0I - 1980. 12





4 1959.04 - 1983.12
4a 1970.01 1983.12 (Super-NOWs and
MMDAs introduced)
The first pair of samples provides a benchmark
estimate ofthe interest elasticity prior to the intro-
duction ofnationWide NOWs. Samples 2,3, and 4
add small increments of time to the benchmark
sample to see if the elasticity changed as NOW
accounts became a larger fraction ofMI. All equa-
tions use intercept shift terms to remove the effects
of the well-known shift in the demand for MI in
mid-1974 through mid-1976.
12 However, nO inter-
cept shift terms were used for the introduction of
nationwide NOWs and Super-NOWs. The estima-
ted interest elasticities and other statistics are pre-
sented in Table 3.
The results of these experiments show little
change in the interest elasticity with the introduction
ofNOWs. The estimatedlong-run interestelasticity
is quite similar for all of the sample periods con-
sidered under both specifications. Samples 2, 3,
and4,whichindude NOWs, yield only slightly
higher interest elasticities than sample I, which
does not include NOWs. For example, for. the
1959.04-1980.12 (sample I) period, the vll.ryirig
and constant elasticity specifications yield elastici-
ties of -0.12 (for a commerciaL paper rate of 8
percent) and -0.13. When the sampleends in 1983.12
(sample 4), the corresponding figures are -0.12 arid
-0.16, respectively.
Table 4 shows the results ofmore formal statistical
tests for shifts in the interest elasticity. For these
tests, the equations were estimated through 1983.12with one additional variable, namely the productof
the commercial paper rate and a zer%ne dummy
variable that is set at unity in the NOW.account
period (1981.01-1983.12) and zero elsewhere. For
the sample beginning in 1959.04, the coefficienton
this additional variable is not statisticallysignificant
from zero, implying that there was no shift in the
interest rate coefficients in 1981/01-1983/12 versus
the earlier part ofthe sample. Forthe sample begin-
ning in 1970, the additional variable was signifi-
cantly different from zero at the 95 percent confi-
dence level. However, the implied change in interest
elasticity has only smalleconomic significance. For
example, in the constant elasticity equation, the
interest elasticity was -0.13 in the earlierperiodand
-0.14 after nationwide NOWs were introduced.
These results support the view that there was no
important change in the interest elasticity in the
NOW account period compared to the elasticity in
the previous eleven years. They thus suggest that
the introduction ofNOWs has not had an important
effect on the velocity of M1through any alteration
in the long-run interest elasticity ofdemand for the
narrow aggregate.
Table 3










































-0.16 15.9 0.0036 -0.12 -0.18 8.8 0.0034
-0.15 1104 0.0039 -0.13 -0.19 7.0 0.0037
-0.16 16.2 0.0037 -0.13 -0.19 9.8 0.0036


















Tests for Changes in M1 Demand Equations























To provide additional evidence of whether the
introduction of interest-bearing checking accounts
was animportantcaliseofthe 1982 Velocitydecline,
we alsoestimated a. demand function forMI exclud-
ing ii1terest-bearingchecking accounts for the periOd
priorto 1979, andexaminedits abilitytoexplainthe
1982•experience.·.This·aggregate, •which eXcludes
NOW accounts, corresponds approximately to the
variable which·the· Federal Reserve described as
MIA upto December 1981. As noted earlier, it has
been argued that the increasing share of interest-
bearing NOW accounts in MI has significantly
alteredthe nature of MI and that the exclusion of
NOWs from MIA explains why MIA velocity
exhibited more "normal" cyclical behavior in
1982-83 than MlveIocity.
However, simulations ofthis MIAdemand equa-
tionstrikingly··contradict this view.· As Table 5
shows, despite the fact that the estimation period 13
ended more than three years previously (in Septem-
ber 1978), the simulation tracks the actual course of
MI in 1982-83 quite well but over-estimates the
growth rate ofMIA. Apparently the growth rate of
MIA in 1982 continuedto be distorted downward
bythe shiftingoffunds outofdemand deposits into
NOW accounts. Hence, the apparent stability of
MIAvelocity was astatistical artifact.
In otherWords, the fact that MIvelocitydeclined
in 1982 a.nd thatofMIAdidnot, does lwtmean that
the demandfimction for MI shifted upward while
that for MIA remained stable. If anything, the
opposite was the case--the demand function of
MIA continued to shift downward and that for MI
remained stable. Indeed, the fact that a demand
function for MIA is able to predict fairly accurately
both the level and the average growth rate ofM1in
1982-83 is conSistent with the view that most ofthe
growth of NOW·· accounts came from demand
deposits, and hence that Ml does not contain a
significant volume of"savings" balances.
TableS









































*All annualand quarterly growth rates are annualized averages ofmonthly rates ofchange.
**Derived from a demand function for MIAestimated over 1970.01-1978.09. Simulation begins in 1978.10.
65III. The StabilityofM2
The results ofthe preceding section suggest that
the introductionofNOW accounts and otherchanges
in the financial system did not significantly reduce
the reliability of MI as a guide to policy~ In this
section we examine the stability ofthe demand for
M2, using asetoftests analogousto those appliedto
Ml. Actually, we estimate equationsforthe non-MI
component of M2. Since the demand forMI was
found to be stable, this means that there were no
significant shifts between MI and the non-Ml. com-
ponent of M2. Thus, the stability of M2 can be
tested by examining its non-Ml component.
We argued earlier that deposit rate deregulation
after June 1978 might lower the responsiveness of
the demand for non-transactions M2 to changes in
market rates of interest and also shorten the .lag
between interest rate changes and changes in
demand. To test this possibility, we estimated
demand functions for non-transactions M2 overtwo
sample periods: January 1970-June 1978 and July
1978-November 1982. In addition, to examine the
impact ofthe introduction ofMoney Market Deposit
Accounts in December 1982, the second sample
was extended through December 1983. As in the
case of MI, both a constant and a varying interest
elasticity specification were tested. 14 The constant
elasticity specification provided a slightly better fit
(in terms ofthe standard errors ofthe equations) in
all sample periods. However, when evaluated atthe
sample means, the estimated elasticities implied by
the varying elasticity specification were very close
to those given by the constant elasticity model.
Tables 6 and 7 show the estimated long-run elas-


















*Estimated equations are shown in the Appendix.
**Thiselasticity is allowed toadjustgraduallyoverthe periodfrom December 1982 to June 1983. The elasticity shown is the estimate for






















*Estimated equations are shown in the Appendix.
**These elasticities are allowed to adjust gradually over the period from December 1982 to June 1983.
The elasticities shown are the estimates for the period after this adjustment was completed.
66yieldonsix-monthcommercialpaper, as well as the
meanlag between changes in the independentvari-
abies and the resultant change. in the dependent
variable. As expected, the mean lag has shortened
and the elasticity has declined since 1978.In the
constant elasticity specification, for example, the
mean lag is estimated to have shortened from 21.7
months before 1978 to 14.7 months after that date.
lnthe constantelasticityspecification, the long-run
elasticity is estimated to have declined from -0.194
before deregulation to -0.140 in the 1978-82 sample
period. Moreov~r,jf the. elasticity depends on the
level of interest rates, this would be an understate-
ment of the effects of deregulation because the
average level of interest rates rose sharply between
these sample. periods. When the elasticities are
evaluated at the mean ofthe whole 1970-82 period
(8.5 percent), the variable elasticity specification
shows a decline in the estimated elasticity from
-0.249 to -0.097. This smallerbut quicker response
of demand to changes in market rates reflects the
fact that the response ofthe own-rate to marketrates
was both more rapid and larger afterderegulation.
Tables 6 and 7 also present the. results from
extendingthe end-pointofthesecondsampleperiod
from November1982 to December 1983, This was
the period•during which •Money. Market Deposit
Accounts.were. introduced and rapidly became a
significant component. of nqn"transactionsM2.
BetweenDecember 1982 andJtme 1983, the share
ofMMDAs in non-transactions M2 wentfromzero
to 23percent, afterwhic;h itremainedapproximately
constant. Tocapturethis institutional development,
the intercept termand the interestrate coefficient in
the equations were assumedtoshift gradually over
those seven months before stabilizing .. The estimates
imply thatthis latest financial change has produced
a further decline inthe long-run interestelasticity.
AfterJune 1983, the estimatedelasticity in the con-
stantelasticity specification is -0.079 compared to
-0.140in 1978-82. Sucha decline would be expected
since. the own-rateonMMDAs is fully market-
determined.
To examine whether the demand for non-trans-
actions M2 remained stable during the velocity
declineperiod, we have estimatedequations priorto
Table 8















7.2 9.4 9.2 10.0 9.3
9.9 7.8 8.4 7.7 8.9
10.3 9.1 9.9 9.0 9.8
9.4 13.9 13.0 14.6 12.6
9.2 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.2
22.6 14.4 12.5 16.2 11.9
8.8 12.8 11.9 14.4 11.4
5.6 10.0 10.1 11.2 10.0
10.2 11.0 11.8 11.0 11.6
11.8 12.0 11.6 13.2 11.3
8.2 11.2 11.3 12.2 11.0
*Calculated as annualized average ofmonthly growth rates in quarter.
**Derived from equations estimated from the following sample periods and specifications.
I-Sample Period 1970.01-1981. 12-ConstantInterest Elasticity
II-Sample Period 1978.07-1981. 12-Constant Interest Elasticity
III-Sample Period 1970.01-1981.12-Varying Interest Elasticity
IV-Sample Period 1978.07-1981.12-Varying Interest Elasticity
67that period and used them to simulate that aggre-
gate's behavior. Since ourearlier results suggested
that the interest elasticity ofdemand and the mean
adjustment lag changed in 1978, it was naturaFto
base these simulations on equations estimated from
1978.07-1981.12. However, in view ofthe shortness
ofthis sample period, we also cornputedsimulations
ofequations estimated over a sample period begin-
ning in 1970.01. As before, both a constant and a
varying elasticity specification were used.
These results, shown in Table 8, supPOrt the
proposition that the demand for non4ransactions
M2 also remained relatively stable overmost ofthe
period of the great velocity decline. The average
growth rate overthe four quarters of 1982 is slightly
over 10 percent in all four simulations, which com-
pares to the actual average growth rate of9.2 per-
cent. However, the equations are less successful
than those for Ml in capturing quarter-to-quarter
variations in the growth rate. The simulations de-
rived from the longersample beginning in 1970tend
to be widerofthe mark, as would be expectedgiven
our earlier finding of a change in the function in
1978. These results imply that, if the Federal
Reserve could have correctly predicted the inde-
pendent variables in our equations, it would not
have been grossly misled in setting M2 targets for
1982 as a whole.
Interpretation of the 1983 simulations is compli-
cated by the surge of growth in the first quarter
associated with the introduction ofMMDAs. As in
1982, the equations predicted the growth rate quite
well for the yearas a whole, but missed the quarter-
to-quarter variations. However, if the results for
January to March 1983 were excluded from consi-
deration on the grounds that M2 growth was dis-
torted by the introduction of MMDAs, then the
equation would over-predict growth in M2-Ml by
from 3.0 to 4.0 percentage points.
IV. Conclusions
This paper contains a comparative analysis ofthe
stability of the demands for Ml and M2 during the
period in which the velocities of both aggregates
declined unexpectedly. The analysis suggests that
these velocity declines represented historically nor-
mal responses ofthe demands for these aggregates
to the surprisingly large decline in inflation and
market interest rates in 1982. This result contradicts
the alternative view that Ml-velocity was unstable
because ofdeposit rate deregulation. Although M2
68
appears to have been influenced by deregulation,
since two changes in the past six years were detected
in the interest elasticity ofthat aggregate, deregula-
tion was not the primary cause of the decline in its
velocity.
One certainly cannot rule out the possibility that
MI will be affected by future deregulation. How-
ever, the rather substantial evidence accumulated
thus far supports the view that MI will continue to
be a useful guideto policy in the foreseeable future.APPENDIX
TableA-1
M1 Demand Regre$sions
(A) LM I = 0.069 O.OO92LCPRT + LPCE + 0.040 LYPERS
(1.59) (6.96) (6.23)
- 0.00086SHFT + 0.OOO022SHFT2
(3.58) (2.49)




Sample = 1959.04 - 1981.
(B) LMI = 0.20 0.0015 CPRT + LPCE + 0.054 LYPERS
(4.06) (8.14) (7.53)
- 0.0012 SHFT + 0.OOO033SHFT2
(4.83) (3.54)




Sample = 1959.04 - 1981.12
(C) LMI = 0.061 - 0.012 LCPRT + LPCE + Q.059LYPERS
(0.62) (5.58) (4.45)
- 0.00097 SHFT + 0.000021 SHFT2
(3.34) (1.99)




Sample = 1970.01 1981.12
69(D) LM I = O. II - 0.0020 CPRT + LPCE + 0.086LYPERS
(1.09) (7.13) (5.97)
- 0.0014 SHFf + 0.000031 SHFf2
(4.97) (2.88)




Sample = 1970.01 - 1981.12
TableA-2
M1A Demand Equation
LMIA = 0.120 - 0.0076 LCPRT + LPCE
(1.37) (4.49)
+ 0.050 LYPERS - 0.00094 SHFf
(3.34) (3.28)
+ 0.000021 SHIFf2 + 0.919 (LMIAI - LPCE) 0.02 U I - 0.09 Uo2
(2.70) (30.68) (0.20) (0.90)
Rl = 0.999
SE = 0.0031
Sample = 1970.01 - 1978.09
TableA-3
Non-Transactions M2 Demand Equations
(A) LM21 = -0.206 - 0.0090 LCPRT + LPCE + 0.075 LYPERS
(2.99) (5.70) (3.44)
+ 1.523 (LM2LI LPCE) - 0.569 (LM2Ll - LPCE)
(20. 15) (7.63)




Sample = 1970.01 1978.06
70(B) LM21 = - 0.176 - 0.0012 CPRT + LPCE + 0.063 LYPERS
(2.57) (5.32) (2.96)
+ 1.546 (LM2LI - LPCE) 0.585 (LM2L2 - LPCE)
(20.42) (7.78)




Sample = 1970.01 - 1978.06
(C) LM21 = - 0.272 - 0.0095 LCPRT + LPCE
(3.60) (5.44)
+ 0.105 LYPERS + 1.030 (LM2 LI - LPCE)
(5.83) (8.79)
0.099 (LM2 L2 - LPCE)
(0.877)




Sample = 1978.07 - 1982.11
(D) LM21 -0.263 0.000808 CPRT + LPCE
(3.46) (5.37)
+1.048 (LM2L I LPCE) - 0.119 (LM2L2 - LPCE)
(8.96) (1.06)




Sample = 1978.07 - 1982.11
71(E) LM21 = -0.260 + 1.061 DUM - 0.304 DUM2 + 0.022 DUM3
(3.70) (8.27) (8.33) (8.35)
-(0.0096 + 0.496 DUM - 0.142 DUM2 + 0.01015 DUM3) LCPRT
(6.09) (8.19) (8.25) (8.26)
+ LPCE + O. 105 LYPERS
(6.57)
+ 1.136 (LM2II - LPCE) 0.206 (LM212 - LPCE)
(15.12) (2.85)




Sample = 1978.07 - 1983.12
(F) LM21 = -0.261 + 0.508 DUM 0.145 DUM2 + 0.010 DUM3
(3.64) (8.43) (8.47) (8.49)
-(0.000836 + 0.0598 DUM - 0.0171 DUM2 + 0.001222 DUM3) CPRT
(6.03) (8.24) (8.29) (8.31)
+LPCE + O. 107 LYPERS
(6.52)
+1.126 (LM211 LPCE) - 0.200 (LM212 - LPCE)
(14.96) (2.77)




Sample = 1978.07 - 1983.12
72listofSymbols
LMI = logofMl
LM21 = log ofM2 minus Ml
LM1A = logofM1excluding OtherCheckable Deposits
CPRT = 6 month commercialpaperrate
LCPRT = log of6 month commercial paperrate
LPCE = logofpersonal consumption expenditure deflator
LYPERS = log ofreal personal income
SHFf = 1,2, ...,24 in 1974.07-1976.06,
=obefore 1974.07,
24 after 1976.06.
SHFf2 = Square ofSHFT
DVM = 1,2,3,4,5,6, 7 in 1982.12-1983.06,
= 0 before 1982.12,
7 after 1983.06
DVM2 = Square ofDVM
DVM3 = Cube ofDVM
V.I = errortenn lagged one month
V.2 = error tenn lagged two months
73FOOTNOTES
1. Over the period from 1960to 1981, the standard devia-
tions ofthe annual growth rates of M1, M2 and M2-M1were
1.76 percent, 2.55 percent and 3.56 percent.
2. This source of velocity changes operates unless the
elasticity of moneydemand with respect to nominal income
is exactly equal to one.
3. See Record of Policy Actions, October 1982.
4. Flint Brayton, Terry Farr, and Richard Porter, "Alternative
Money Demand Specifications and Recent Growth in M1 ",
Unpublished Paper, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, May23, 1983.
5. This point would be invalid if the demand for M1 re-
sponds to basis point rather than to proportionate changes
in interest rates. Regression results presented later in this
papershowthat a specification in which percentchanges in
money demand respond to basis point changes in interest
rates (that is, a semi-log specification) fits the data as least
as well as a constant elasticity specification.
6. For two examples of this line of argument, see R.W
Hafer, "The Money-GNP Link: Assessing Alternative Trans-
actions Measures", Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis, Volume 66, No.3, March 1984, and Stephen H.
Axilrod, "Issues in Monetary Targeting and Velocity," in
Monetary Targeting and Velocity, Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco, December 1983.
7. Theonly significant remaining componentofthe non-M1
portion of M2 that bears a fixed return is passbook saving
accounts. These accounts now represent less than one-fifth
of the non-M1 portion of M2.
8. We use this phrase to mean M2 excluding M1 even
though some assets in this aggregate provide limited
checking facilities.
9. The own rate of return on M2-M1 is represented by the
so-called "Fitzgerald rate." It is the deposit ceiling rate
yielding the highest instantaneous holding period yield. It is
calculated by fitting the Treasury yield curve through each
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ceiling deposit rate, and extending each curve back to the
point where maturity equals zero. The highest rate calcula-
ted in this way in a particular month isthe Fitzgerald rate for
that month.
10. John J. Balles, "Defining the Issues", in Monetary
Targeting and Velocity, Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco, December 1983, pp, 14-21; Michael W, Keran,
"Velocity and Monetary Policy in 1982" Weekly Letter,
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, March 18, 1983;
John P. Judd, "The Recent Decline in Velocity: Instability in
Money Demand or Inflation?", Economic Review, Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Spring 1983, pp. 12-19;
John P. Judd and Rose McElhattan, "The Behaviorof Money
and the Economy in 1982-83", Economic Review, Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Summer 1983; andBrian
Motley, "Money, Inflation and Interest Rates", Weekly
Letter, August 5,1983.
11. See Thomas D. Simpson, "Changes in the Financial
System: Implications for Monetary Policy." Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 1984.
12. See John P. Judd and John L. Scadding, "The Search
for a Stable Money Demand Function: A Survey of the
Post-1973 Literature", Journal of Economic Literature,
September, 1982, pp. 993-1023.
13. The estimated equation used in thistest is shown in the
Appendix.
14. See the Appendix for details ofthe equations estimated.
Various alternative specifications were tested as well as
those reported here. For example, the distributed lags also
were estimated using the Almon method: the resulting esti-
mates of the long-run elasticities were essentially identical
to those in Tables 6 and 7. Preliminary tests in which both
the commercial paper rate and the own-rate were included
in the estimating equations produced unstable parameter
values, presumably reflecting the high degreeofcollinearity
between these rates.